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ABSTRACT
The notion of causal explanation is an essential element of the naturalistic world view. 
This view is typically interpreted to claim that we are only licensed to postulate enti-
ties that make a “causal difference”, or have “causal power”. The rest are epiphenomena 
and hence eliminable from the correct view of reality. The worry that some entities and 
phenomena that we take for granted – mental properties in particular – turn out to be 
epiphenomenal, can be seen as stemming from this sort of naturalistic attitude.
This thesis reviews the issue of causal explanation within the context of the natu-
ralistic philosophy of mind. It is argued that there is no single monolithic, unanimously 
accepted notion of causation that the naturalist should be committed to. Views vary on 
what this notion amounts to exactly, and fields of science vary with respect to their caus-
al commitments. However, the naturalist can still presume that a scientifically informed 
philosophical account of causation exists, an account that is fundamentally philosophi-
cal, but also sensitive to actual scientific practice and its view of reality.
The central issue of the current naturalistic philosophy of mind is the so-called prob-
lem of causal exclusion. According to this, the assumption that mental states could have 
genuine and autonomous effects on the physical world is inconsistent with physical 
commitments, namely the idea that mental states are necessarily neurally based and the 
idea that the physical world is causally complete. The causal exclusion argument claims 
that mental causes must be reduced to physical causes, as there remains no role for in-
dependent mental causes.
The thesis reviews some central responses to the causal exclusion argument. It is 
shown that within the context of the interventionist notion of causation, inter-level 
causation can be ruled out. The causal exclusion argument would thus find support, 
contrary to what the proponents of the interventionist view typically claim. However, 
the result is also shown to have the corollary that purely higher-level, mental-to-mental 
causation is possible. The thesis suggests that this offers a consistent view of mental 
causation for a naturalist to hold.
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Preface
Completing this thesis has been an unexpectedly long and winding journey. Many things 
have happened and I am in a totally different place now than where I was when I started, 
both academically and personally.
I started this work with a metaphilosophical agenda. In my master’s thesis I had studied 
the foundations of empiricism, namely the question of how pure sensory data (supposing 
that there is such thing) could mesh with the conceptual elements of cognition to produce 
reliable propositional information. This project already had a distinct naturalistic attitude 
and much of the discussion drew from the psychology of perception and linguistics – and 
all the of naturalistic philosophy of mind that is sensitive to these matters. However, upon 
finishing the project it became apparent that the elements of the thesis did not go togeth-
er. Although I could not immediately put my finger on it, there was definitely something 
fundamentally wrong. If I was ever going to do philosophy again, I had to investigate the 
source of this uneasiness. This is what I originally set out to do in this thesis.
The period after I had finished my master’s thesis was marked by personal turmoil 
and soul-searching. Like many others, I found the chances of doing fruitful philosophical 
analysis under the strain of empirical science very bleak. Such feelings can become very 
concrete for a young philosopher who has no solid conception of philosophy, science 
or life in general. In different circumstances, with slightly different turns of events and 
decisions – if, for example, I would have not become frustrated with the management 
of the bakery where I was working at the time – things might have turned out entirely 
differently. It was by no means clear that I would pursue an academic career.
It is one of the first lessons in metaphysics of causation that each turn of an event is 
preceded by an astronomical number of causal antecedents that are necessary for bring-
ing about that event in exactly the way it happened to occur. There is, however, a very 
distinct moment in history that can be pointed to as an event that initiated the process 
that led into the thesis as it appears here. I wrote my master’s thesis under the supervi-
sion of docent Markus Lammenranta and Professor Ilkka Niiniluoto, and upon finishing 
the project, they both encouraged me to continue and start to work on a PhD. This sup-
port alone was not enough to convince me that it was prudent to commit to such an un-
dertaking, but after a few months I was notified that the department of philosophy was 
going to grant small scholarships to a few promising postgraduate students, and that I 
would be one of the recipients, if I just submited an application. I remember professor 
Gabriel Sandu being particularly encouraging and active on this matter.
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I am grateful to all three of these people, and to the department of philosophy, for 
taking the right actions at the right time. Receiving that small start-up grant can defi-
nitely be singled out as an event that set this project in motion. Markus also took on the 
role of a supervisor of the thesis. Years have passed, but his encouragement has never 
waned and his support has always been steadfast.
The first article in the thesis derives from this time. The first version was written ten 
years ago and it appears here largely in the form that it was originally conceived. The 
article is an attempt to couch in rational terms some of the uneasiness that the work on 
the master’s thesis had prompted. Its main insight is that the possibility of eliminative 
naturalism has been largely overlooked. The focus of this article was epistemology, but 
the initial idea was to go further and apply this approach to issues in philosophy of mind 
and philosophy of language. This would require taking seriously the sciences that are 
essential to naturalistic philosophy, biology in particular.
I first came to Viikki, to the faculty of biological and environmental sciences, to study 
ecology and evolutionary biology under the supervision of docent Kari Vepsäläinen. His 
seminar series on current questions in evolutionary biology were legendary and I at-
tended one with little previous knowledge of biology. Rather than focus on my obvious 
inabilities, Kari welcomed me as philosophical advisor, and I soon found myself assisting 
him in organizing new seminars. I am grateful for his open attitude and all of the help I 
received from him. I would not be where I am had I not had his support.
At this time I was searching for a place to complete my civilian service. Kari intro-
duced me to professor Kristian Donner, who was heading the division of animal physi-
ology. There was a civilian service position at the division and it was soon decided that 
I would fulfil my duty there. This gave me the opportunity to deepen my knowledge of 
biology and teach philosophy to biologists. During the year I was fortunate to encounter 
many motivated and bright students, some of whom are still my friends.
 This time was so fruitful for all parties involved that I subsequently stayed on 
in Viikki and resumed my work on this thesis. Kristian also assumed the role of a su-
pervisor of my thesis. It has been a great pleasure and honour to work as his student, 
colleague and friend. Our regular meetings have always been sincere and sharp, with 
discussion topics ranging from culture and politics to philosophy, science and life in 
general. Kristian’s help in practical matters has been simply invaluable. If only all of us 
were that well equipped both theoretically and practically.
 During my stay in Viikki I have had the privilege to enjoy the stimulating com-
pany of a number of students and researchers. I have learned much from Vesa Selonen, 
Tiina Huttu, Tero Viitanen, Juuso Juuri, Tomi Maila, Kai Kaila, Roosa Laitinen, Isaac 
Salazar-Ciudad, Heikki Helanterä, Arto Annila, Petri Ala-Laurila, Neil Bell and Gunther 
Jansen. I remember many nightly discussions on science and philosophy with Roosa in 
parties and in the hallways and corridors of the Biocentres. Although we may have had 
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a somewhat bumpy ride, I still remember those days with warmth and respect. Arto has 
infected me with the need to see everything in terms of the 2nd law. I have yet to decide 
whether this is a good or a bad thing. Heikki has been my collaborator in theoretical and 
philosophical evolutionary biology and I’m looking forward to working on our future 
projects (and finalizing some that we have already started). Neil has revised the English 
of several of my manuscripts, including a draft of this thesis. I’m deeply grateful for all 
the work he has done. I think I owe him at least one more crazy dinner party.
 Gunther came to study systematics under the supervision of Kari Vepsäläinen 
and Riitta Savolainen, and we were quickly introduced to each other. His wide interest 
in biology, science, philosophy and culture ensured that we always had things to dis-
cuss and projects to plan. Together with Gunther we founded the Viikki Study Group on 
Philosophy of Science, and I want to thank Gunther, Kristian, Heikki, Neil, Wouter Vahl, 
Jonathan Jeschke and all the other participants for enjoyable meetings and stimulating 
discussions. I think I have always learned something new.
 After resuming my work on this thesis two things happened. First, it soon became 
apparent that my original idea for a thesis rested on assumptions that were in a need of 
thorough reanalysis. Although the issue of causality and causal explanation lies at the 
heart of naturalism and naturalistic philosophy of mind, much of the discussion relies 
on a rather vague conception of these. I understood that in order to address the issues 
that I was originally interested in, this is where my focus should be. Second, I became 
more and more involved with the sport of cycling.
For two years I served as president of Prologi, the Helsinki University Cycling Club, 
and a further year as vice-president. In 2007 I was in charge of establishing the Tour de 
Helsinki, an open cycle race taking place in Helsinki and its vicinity. In 2008 I founded 
Velocitor Ltd, which has since been the organizing body of the race. And in 2010 I found-
ed Team Velocitor, an elite class road racing team sponsored by Velocitor Ltd. Although 
looking back now all of these ventures have been rewarding in many ways, they have 
definitely taken a toll on my work on this thesis. At times I have felt that cycling has 
meant nothing but teeth grinding and sleepless nights. I could certainly have had a more 
relaxing hobby than running a sporting event promotion business. Nevertheless, a mark 
has been left on the Finnish sporting scene, and the experience has definitely been edify-
ing. I want to thank Olli Heikurinen and Tuomas Turunen who have stood by me in these 
endeavours.
 From 2010 to 2011 I served two years as the Chairman of the Committee for Edu-
cational Affairs of the Student Union of the University of Helsinki (HYY). This allowed 
me to see the administrative and political side of the university and its educational pro-
cesses. I want to thank all of the numerous friends and colleagues I got to know and 
work with during these years and with whom I had the pleasure of enjoying countless 
nocturnal adventures in various parties, student houses, bars and saunas.
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All work, even writing a philosophy thesis, occurs within in a larger social context. I 
want to thank all my old friends who never gave up teasing me about the status of this 
work. Special thanks are due to Aleksi Salokannel and Sisin for helping me to prepare the 
final layout of the thesis. I am grateful beyond words to Ida Vartiala for her love and sup-
port. She has given me the strength to carry on through to the final stages of this project. 
Finally, I want to thank my parents, Kalevi and Ulla Pernu, for their encouragement and 
relentless support
The articles collected in this thesis span several years and several different stages 
of my life. None of this would have been possible without the generous support I have 
received from various institutions. Apart from the start-up grant I received from the de-
partment of philosophy, I am particularly grateful to the Emil Aaltonen Foundation for 
a three year grant that I was awarded during the early stages of this work. The work for 
this study has been made financially possible by (in alphabetical order):
The Emil Aaltonen Foundation
The Department of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki
The Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation
The Finnish Cultural Foundation
The Waldemar von Frenckell Foundation
The Institute of Biotechnology at the University of Helsinki
The Alfred Kordelin Foundation
The Otto A. Malm Foundation
The University of Helsinki Funds
The University of Helsinki
The Oskar Öflund Foundation
I hereby express my deepest and most sincere gratitude to all these institutions that 
deemed my work worthy of supporting.
Tuomas Pernu
Helsinki, November 2013
Part I 
Introductory Essay
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1. Introduction
Take two natural and prima facie metaphysically innocent assumptions. Suppose first 
that there are genuine causal relationships between properties. Suppose next that these 
properties are divided into distinct levels: they are organized hierarchically in such a 
way that there are higher-level properties that are composed out of lower-level prop-
erties. Now burning questions start to arise. What is the relationship between higher 
and lower-level properties? Can higher-level properties figure in autonomous causal re-
lationships even if higher-level properties are composed of lower-level properties? Or 
are the relationships epiphenomenal or derivative of lower-level, ultimately real, causal 
relationships?
These questions are pervasive. They are central to metaphysics and the philosophy 
of science, and resonate through practically all fields of science and philosophy. Most 
notably the issue is present in debates over the autonomy of the special sciences – the 
question of whether chemistry reduces to physics, biology to chemistry, psychology to 
biology, the social sciences to psychology and so on. In each case one typically ends up 
asking whether the phenomena studied at a particular level of science can be fully ac-
counted for solely by reference to the dynamics of the underlying science. Within the 
particular disciplines themselves, the issue often takes the form of asking whether a 
certain collective or group that is composed of individual entities can enjoy autonomous 
existence and engage in interactions independently of, or over and above, these indi-
viduals and their interactions. To take an example from evolutionary biology, one such 
prominent issue is to what degree different levels, e.g. genes, individuals and groups 
of individuals, need to be taken into account in explaining evolutionary changes. Often 
such issues mark the boundaries between disciplines or sub-disciplines.
Even formal philosophical disciplines such as logic and philosophy of language are 
not left untouched. They become relevant as soon as one tries to get a more rigorous 
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grip on the issue. But more importantly, through a metaphilosophical twist, all norma-
tive philosophical disciplines, including ethics, are affected. For as soon as one adopts 
the naturalistic stance favoured by many philosophers today, one is left wondering how 
such normative disciplines could fit within the causal scheme of things. Epistemology, 
in its naturalized form, is also immediately affected, for it becomes pertinent to ask how 
epistemology and epistemic attitudes could have causal relevance.
Nowhere, however, are these questions more tangible than in the field of philosophy 
of mind. On the one hand we have a clear conception of our bodies as physical entities. 
Our bodies are not dead, inanimate objects, of course, but living biological organisms. 
But they are nevertheless physical in the sense that the various processes and actions 
that they undergo can be accounted for in wholly physicochemical terms. This, in es-
sence, is what the last one hundred years of physiology and neuroscience has taught 
us. There are no vital powers or mysterious forces that need to be evoked to explain the 
functioning of our bodies. Whether this amounts to claiming that physiology may be 
reduced to biochemistry and biophysics is already one formulation of the issue at hand. 
The issue becomes more concrete, however, in a form of another question that is bound 
to spring up immediately. For, on the other hand, we have an equally clear conception of 
our minds as mental, i.e. non-physical, entities. Obviously, this apparent dualism cries 
for elaboration, but let us assume for now that there is a naturalistically acceptable ac-
count of an “emergence”, “constitution” or “realization” relation that explains how such 
an entity can be related to a physical basis. As already noted, the view of a hierarchical 
ordering of nature is at least intuitively appealing. But relying on such a view seems to 
force problems on us rather than solve them. For now we are faced with the very issue 
of mental causation or mind-body interactionism: the question of how such metaphysi-
cally distinct entities as bodies and minds can causally influence each other. The basic 
conflict here is not difficult to grasp. On the one hand nothing seems more natural to 
us than the idea that with our thoughts, desires and conscious decisions we can control 
our actions and have an impact on the physical world around us. On the other hand our 
behaviour and its influence on the world can be fully explained in physical terms, in the 
vein sketched above. In consequence, our mental lives seem to be left with a rather idle 
role. But such a conclusion seems to contradict not only the very image of ourselves as 
active, personal and morally responsible agents, but also our common sense and our 
everyday social and legal practices. Naturalizing the mind does not come cheap.
Although the basic problem of mental causation is fairly easy to grasp, when looked 
at more closely one is soon faced with diverse philosophical issues that intertwine. One 
is led to ponder the scientific status of propositional attitudes and intentionality, the 
qualitative and subjective nature of conscious experiences, and the ancient and notori-
ous problem of free will. All of these issues are entangled with deep and equally notori-
ous questions about the metaphysical nature of causation, varieties of scientific expla-
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nation and the scope and limits of reductionism. Philosophers are quite careful to keep 
these issues apart, and often tend to concentrate on only one particular facet of this 
manifold problem. But outside the domain of philosophy proper, this systematic attitude 
soon evaporates and all these diverse issues merge into one big and mysterious puzzle 
that seems to elude all rational scrutiny and discussion.
Since the issues at hand are so diverse and the analysis prone to confusion, it is espe-
cially important to be as clear as possible about the aim and scope of this study: it treats 
the problem of mental causation as a general problem for the philosophy of science at an 
abstract metaphysical level. The emphasis is on the causality side of the problem, rather 
than on the mentality side. That is, the main topic is the metaphysical nature of causation 
and the nature of causal explanation in science with respect to mental states and psycho-
logical explanation. The exact nature of the mental – as distinct from the physical – is not 
the prime focus here. It is simply taken for granted that mental states or psychological ex-
planation constitute a prima facie genuine and independent domain. What is of concern 
is the causal status of this domain with respect to the physical. The core question can be 
easily posed: supposing that the physical domain is complete, with each physical effect 
having sufficient physical causes, and supposing that the mental domain is something 
distinct from the physical domain, what causal role, if any, is left for the mental to play?
2. Naturalism
Let us start by elaborating the metaphilosophical background of this study. It falls within 
the scope of naturalistic philosophy or naturalism. Naturalism, in turn, can have a diver-
sity of meanings depending on the kind of philosophy or historical period one is focus-
ing on. There is the metaphysical naturalism of Aristotle and its scholastic descendants, 
there is the tradition of natural philosophy starting from the inception of modern sci-
ence – perhaps most notably represented by Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica (1687) – and there is the pragmatic tradition of naturalism, stemming from 
Dewey (1903), for example. However, the type of naturalism that this study is concerned 
with is the modern scientific philosophical naturalism that has arisen from – or was 
born as a reaction to – the logical positivism and analytic philosophy of the early twenti-
eth century. This is the naturalistic tradition outlined by Quine (1951, 1969).
Within this tradition there are two different strains or facets that need to be distin-
guished. The most fundamental idea, and one that can be taken as the connecting theme 
in the different historical variations of naturalism, is the rejection of the supernatural as 
an explanation of the world. This includes not just the physical realm, but the entire ani-
mate world as well, including human action and psyche. According to this ontological or 
metaphysical naturalism, the world is one all-encompassing natural system with no su-
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pernatural ingredients. As such, this characterization is clearly not very informative. It is 
hardly very revealing to say that naturalism is not supernaturalism. To make this stance 
more substantial, it needs to be supplemented with some criterion for distinguishing 
the “natural”, and thus “real”, from the “supernatural”, or “unreal”. The criterion that the 
naturalist is bound to resort to is the conviction that only entities and phenomena that 
are acknowledged by science, or at least in principle possible to investigate by empirical 
means, are considered real. That is, the scientific, empirical method is our only source 
of information and means of postulating real entities, phenomena and processes. There 
are no privileged intuitive, contemplative or philosophical sources of information. This 
is the methodological component of modern naturalism.
The methodological side of naturalism quickly extends towards a more radical and 
controversial form of naturalism. If empirical science is given the exclusive right to 
serve us information and shape our view of reality, this will leave philosophy, and epis-
temology in particular, in a rather straitened situation. According to the traditional and 
intuitively appealing view, the scientific study of reality is preceded by philosophical 
contemplation and analysis – does not our confidence in the empirical method itself 
rely on a particular philosophical view of epistemology, namely empiricism? But now 
this naturalized epistemology seems to require us to replace philosophical analysis with 
empirical, scientific research. Or, if this is too radical, at least traditional epistemology 
is required to yield up its privileged position and admit that it needs to be empirically 
informed and corrigible. It is easy to appreciate why many may find this philosophically 
uncomfortable.
This study is not primarily a treatise on the aim and scope of naturalism or the pos-
sibility of philosophy within the naturalistic scheme. Naturalism, in the vein character-
ized above, is taken for granted. This thesis is a study within this naturalistic tradition. 
However, it is instructive to point out some problems that this naturalistic philosophy 
is bound to face. Many of these critical issues will resurface within the naturalistic re-
search program itself. After all, the notion of causal explanation in general, and the prob-
lem of mental causation in particular, is ridden with concerns about what the naturalis-
tic attitude is committed to hold as ultimately real.
The most obvious, and most discussed, problem faced by naturalistic philosophy is 
the question of how normative elements, which form the core of most philosophical 
disciplines, fit within this empirical and purely descriptive research scheme. As already 
hinted, epistemology (as traditionally conceived) is not the study of actual belief forma-
tion processes. What epistemology is concerned with is the question of how we should 
form our beliefs. Although the former issue can be seen as interesting and relevant in 
many ways – for one thing, it might be nice to know whether our actual belief formation 
processes match the ones we aspire to – the latter question is the fundamental one, and 
the one that is characteristically philosophical. But epistemology is no exception. Logic 
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and ethics are also philosophical disciplines that are not primarily concerned with the 
actual world and our place and behaviour in it, but with describing correct and better 
ways of reasoning, thinking or behaving. Whether, or how, these disciplines are possible 
within naturalistic philosophy is an important and widely discussed question in current 
philosophy. However, this is not an issue that this thesis is primarily concerned with.
Although the problematic situation of normative philosophy is something that must 
be acknowledged and the extensive discussion surrounding the issue is well deserved, 
there is another cluster of problematic issues that seems to be largely overlooked. They 
are also more directly relevant to this study. These are the issues that result from the 
internal tensions that naturalistic philosophy is bound to be infected with. Although ap-
plying the naturalistic attitude may sound attractively simple and straightforward, and 
something that would help us to solve or bypass some of the traditionally insurmount-
able philosophical problems, on closer inspection this optimism may turn out to be ill-
founded. The problem is that there is no unequivocal and universally accepted concep-
tion of what exactly the scientifically informed view of reality amounts to.
The basic observation, which often seems to get overlooked, is that the sort of natural-
ism discussed here is a type of conventionalism. Science and scientific research comprise 
highly diverse and variable practices that are in a state of constant change. What science 
deems to be real now, it can denounce as unreal in the future, and vice versa. Such fallibi-
lism is one of the central characteristics of scientific research. This in itself does not need 
to be a vice. After all, naturalists are the first to note that renouncing traditional founda-
tionalist philosophical tendencies is one of the central advantages of naturalistic philoso-
phy. However, at the same time, this variability cripples the aspiration that naturalism 
could offer clear-cut answers to foundational metaphysical and epistemological issues. 
Different scientific disciplines, at different times, have different methods and postulate 
different entities and processes. Often this variability is difficult to fit together. There is 
no single unified scientific stance on reality. Disputes on what kind of entities to postu-
late, and what are the best and most correct ways of carrying out scientific research, rage 
constantly, not only between scientific disciplines, but also within them. To settle such 
disputes, philosophical analysis seems to be called for. But naturalistic philosophy seems 
to be ill-equipped to offer any help. To reach a unified view on reality you would need to 
pick out a specific science, with a specific method, at a specific time. But such a choice 
would seem completely arbitrary from the naturalistic perspective, for there is supposed 
to be no prescientific philosophical justification for such choices.
This problem is not merely abstractly philosophical, but very concrete. Suppose we 
settle on the following general characterization of science: scientific research is objec-
tive quantitative analysis of empirical data. Empiricism is definitely something that we 
should deem essential to the scientific method. But how about logic and mathematics? 
Surely they are not empirical sciences? But it is difficult to imagine any scientific re-
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search managing without them. It seems that the naturalist will have to accept at least 
this many extra-empirical ingredients in her world view. Objectivity is again something 
that seems to characterize the scientific method. It is an essential feature of any sci-
entific research that the data and methods are able to be publicly scrutinized and that 
the results are at least in principle repeatable. But how about the subjective feelings 
and experiences that are so characteristic of our mental lives? They are not only central 
to our everyday life, and as such should earn our full scientific attention, but also con-
stitute a concrete research subject for psychology and medicine. Should the naturalist 
instruct us to refrain from such research? Such advice would seem completely arbitrary 
and would go against the naturalist’s own commitment to take science at face value. 
Consider finally the quantitative method. It is certainly characteristic of science that the 
data and results of research are quantitatively representable and communicable. But 
much of the research in psychology, humanities, the social sciences and medicine is car-
ried in qualitative terms. Again, forcing quantitative research in line with the rest of the 
sciences does not seem like an attractive option.
One problematic issue is particularly relevant from the perspective of this study. 
This is the question how, exactly, naturalism and physicalism relate to each other. Physi-
calism is a metaphysical thesis according to which all that exists is physical, or deter-
mined by the underlying physical reality. Does naturalism entail physicalism? And more 
importantly, if it does, what sort of physicalism, the reductive or non-reductive kind? The 
first thing to note here is the obvious close connection of physicalism to physics. So one 
could reformulate the question thus: does naturalism entail that physics has a some-
how privileged or fundamental status among the sciences? There certainly seems to be 
a strong tendency to answer this in the positive. However, that is clearly a particular 
interpretation of what naturalism amounts to, not a necessary connection. Many find a 
more relaxed interpretation more useful. 
But even if physics is regarded as a benchmark science, this does not necessarily help 
naturalism to resolve the issues that it aspires to resolve. First of all, as is widely acknowl-
edged, what physics is and what kind of entities it postulates varies in time. Hence, as 
before, it is not at all clear what kind view of reality the naturalist is committed to accept, 
even if naturalism is taken to entail physicalism. The problem the naturalist now faces 
can be neatly formulated as a dilemma, presumably first posed by Hempel (1969): either 
the naturalist will have to rely on a view offered by the current physics, which is in all 
probability false, for as we know from history, physics will change and the current view 
will be discarded, or alternatively on a view of an ideal future physics, which amounts 
to a rather empty view, for no-one knows what such a physics will look like. If the views 
that the naturalist has on offer are either false or purely speculative, naturalism does not 
seem to amount to a thesis that is any better off than the traditional philosophical doc-
trines it seeks to replace. Second, even if the naturalist opts for the first horn of the di-
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lemma and claims, for example, that the view we should be interested in is one based on 
current physics and that it does not matter for the current discussion that physics and 
the view resulting from it might change in the future, this might not improve the situa-
tion significantly. The problem is that there is no single currently unanimously accepted 
view on physical reality, even within physics itself. Physics is a large and variable field of 
ongoing research. Physicists disagree on what the fundamental nature of reality is, and, 
more notably, on whether all of the entities and phenomena that we acknowledge as 
real are ultimately derivable from the basic entities and processes that this fundamental 
physical research postulates. That is, it is only a physicist with particular philosophical 
inclinations that might think that physics holds a special and fundamental place among 
the sciences. To many, this issue is simply not relevant. Some think that physics itself has 
actually shown how many of the entities and phenomena mundanely acknowledged as 
real and studied by other empirical sciences simply cannot be derived from the data and 
theories of fundamental physics.
What this suggests is that even if some sort of physicalism is entailed by, or at least is 
closely connected to naturalism, it is a genuinely open question whether this physical-
ism is of the reductive or non-reductive kind. In fact, it is fair to say that although the 
majority of today’s philosophers would admit to being naturalists of some sort, and even 
physicalists, only a minority would admit to being reductive physicalists. How exactly 
reductionism should then be understood, is another problematic and widely discussed 
issue. However, there is a particular view that receives most of the attention in the cur-
rent discussion. This is the view that holds that although the basic foundation of reality 
is thoroughly physical, the higher levels of reality supervene on this physical foundation. 
Supervenience, in turn, is taken to be a non-reductive, asymmetric dependence rela-
tion. That is, higher levels of reality are dependent on, and determined by, the subvening 
physical basis, but they are not reducible to it. This is the core idea of the current non-
reductive physicalism. It is also the view that is most relevant to the present study. The 
issue of mental causation in naturalistic philosophy largely concerns the question of 
whether this type of non-reductive physicalism is a stable view.
Although the preceding discussion connected the metaphysical facet of naturalism 
to the methodological one via the latter’s ability to supply the former with a criterion for 
separating the real and the unreal, there is also another route open for the metaphysi-
cal naturalist to substantiate her thesis. Rather than directly resort to the authority of 
the sciences, the naturalist can stress that there is a particular form of explanation that 
is characteristically scientific and hence can act as our guide to what is ultimately real. 
This is the causal form of explanation. What this view holds, basically, is that we are li-
censed to postulate only entities that make a “causal difference” or have “causal power”. 
The rest is epiphenomena and eschewable by science, and hence eliminable from the 
correct view of reality. Although perhaps not that often explicitly acknowledged as such, 
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this is certainly an intuitively attractive and consequently widely held view. The concern 
that some entities and phenomena that we take for granted – mental properties in par-
ticular – may turn out to be epiphenomenal can be seen as stemming from this sort of 
naturalistic attitude.
However, this view is plagued by familiar problems. For example, why should causal 
explanation enjoy such a privileged status? Are there not other ways of making sense of 
the world that are also scientifically legitimate? Once again we turn to logic, mathemat-
ics and other theoretical or abstract ways of explaining the world. Surely there are per-
fectly cogent, purely mathematical explanations of some features of reality? And being 
purely mathematical, surely such explanations are not causal? If that is the case, then 
the naturalist must admit that appealing to causal explanation as a criterion for demar-
cating the real from the unreal cannot be the whole story.
But there are even more deeply problematic issues related to this view. Even if we 
would be prepared to grant causal explanation this privileged status, it is not at all clear 
what exactly this “causal difference-making” or “causal power” would amount to. Al-
though causal explanation has a seductively naturalistic ring to it, and undeniably many 
scientists would grant that causal explanation is something that they are essentially pur-
suing in their research, it is also widely acknowledged that causality is something that 
notoriously eludes the sciences. Again, there are many different problems here.
First and foremost, the question of what causation is exactly is one of the most ve-
hemently discussed metaphysical issues in the history of philosophy. The debate is no 
less heated today. There are many different accounts on the table, each with their pros 
and cons, with different fields of philosophy and science favouring different notions. In 
consequence, there is no single and unanimously accepted account of causation that the 
naturalist can simply put into use.
Second, assuming that naturalism is closely connected to physicalism, it becomes 
immediately relevant to enquire about the exact nature of physical causation. But there 
are in fact well-founded reasons to suspect that there is no such thing as physical causa-
tion. As Russell (1913) famously pointed out, if we look at the “advanced sciences such as 
gravitational astronomy”, the word “cause” never occurs there, which, along with other 
reasons, should lead us to conclude that the notion is simply “a relic of a bygone age, 
surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm” 
(p. 1). Now, perhaps “gravitational astronomy” is not the best example of an “advanced 
science” of today, but the argument is still compelling: if we look at dynamical physical 
theories, what we tend to find is not causal relationships, but rather functional relation-
ships between variables and data-points. Changes in physical systems are not due to 
different factors being in causal interaction so much as to the system as a whole unfold-
ing. What this should lead the physicalist to do (as it led Russell) is to conclude that the 
notion of causation should be abandoned.
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Third, even if we would not be so confined to fundamental physics, it is not at all clear 
that there is some well-defined and universally accepted notion of causation to be found 
in the special sciences. Here the situation is reversed: if the word “cause” never appears 
in physical theories, the opposite can be said to hold in all other sciences – the problem 
is not that the word does not appear, but rather that the sciences are at a loss as to what 
the word means. Biology, medicine and psychology, for example, can be described as be-
ing in the business of deciphering causal relationships. However, at the same time, the 
often recurring theme in discussions on data and research results is the question how 
these should be understood causally. What we see are complex patterns of statistical 
connections and correlations that do not have any straightforward causal interpreta-
tion. Such an interpretation awaits a philosophically informed account of what causa-
tion fundamentally is. The naturalist cannot just go and have a look at scientific practice 
and pick out the proper notion of causal explanation from there, even if the word itself 
is abundantly used, because there simply is no solid notion behind the word.
With all this criticism marched against naturalism, a rational person might start 
to wonder whether it would be a better to stay away from naturalistic philosophy. The 
problem is that there are no real options. Empirical science, with natural sciences and 
physics at the forefront, is, and has always been, closely connected to philosophy. The 
two will have to get along, whether we like it or not. Which does not mean, of course, 
that the details of their coexistence should not be exposed to critical analysis and thor-
ough discussion. That is what today’s philosophy is largely engaged with.
As already stressed, this thesis is not primarily concerned with whether or how the 
naturalistic project can be justified. However, after raising all these problems with it, it is 
appropriate to end with a few positive remarks. First, one could note that the preceding 
discussion was perhaps overly simplistic and dichotomous. There are obvious tensions 
between naturalistic aspirations and scientific practice. But this does not mean that the 
two could not influence each other and have a fruitful coexistence. What we might have 
to conclude, however, is that we need to abandon – at least for the time being – the more 
radical naturalistic idea that philosophy should be replaced with empirical science. We 
might need to settle for the more conventional view that stresses only the continuity be-
tween the two. What this view must also acknowledge – and this is often overlooked – is 
that it is not only philosophy that needs to be informed by the sciences. The empirical 
sciences must also be sensitive to philosophical analysis, whenever the need for such ap-
pears. If the naturalist is serious about insisting that the two must be on a par with each 
other, then she must acknowledge that the continuum runs both ways.
Causal explanation is a topic that exemplifies well this more relaxed and interac-
tive view of naturalism. Causal explanation is something that is clearly a characteristic 
of science, as already stressed. But it is also something that is in need of philosophical 
clarification. This does not have to be a stalemate. What we can, and should, go after is a 
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scientifically informed philosophical account of causation, an account that is fundamentally 
philosophical, but also sensitive to actual scientific practice and views of reality. There 
can be no a priori guidelines for formulating such an account. It can only arise out of a 
sincere dialogue between philosophy and science.
It is worth pointing out that in fact Russell (1948) was an excellent representative of 
this attitude towards causal explanation. Although he is known for his criticism of the 
notion of cause, he also admitted that there is a “primitive notion of cause” that is both 
fundamentally philosophical and scientifically relevant. He writes:
The concept “cause”, as it occurs in the works of most philosophers, is one which 
is apparently not used in any advanced science. But the concepts that are used 
have been developed from the primitive concept (which is that prevalent among 
philosophers), and the primitive concept [...] still has importance as the source 
of approximate generalisations and pre-scientific inductions, and as a concept 
which is valid when suitably limited. (1948, p. 471.)
Russell goes on to define the notion of a “causal line”, which in essence is a series of 
events that manifests “quasi-permanence” of some quantity or quality. Neither the de-
tails of Russell’s account, nor the final verdict on it, are important. What is notable is 
the characteristically naturalist attitude that shifts the emphasis from an eliminativistic 
conclusion to one that is sensitive to both sides of the story, the philosophical and the 
scientific.
What is fundamentally meant by causation is of course an interesting and relevant 
question, but not the question on which the present study is focused. The aim is not to 
develop a naturalistically adequate account of causal explanation. This study does not 
even rely on some particular view of causation. The reasons for such agnosticism were 
laid out in the reasoning just presented. Since neither pure philosophy nor scientific 
practice on its own seems able to provide a complete account of causation, we need to 
rely on advice from both. That advice is scattered. There are many different but mutu-
ally inconsistent philosophical intuitions, and many different scientific disciplines rely-
ing on different explanation practices. Fitting all of this together to form, ultimately, a 
naturalistically solid account of causation that is both philosophically and scientifically 
useful will depend on an iterative process of give and take. We need to contrast philo-
sophical analysis with scientific practice, piece by piece, back and forth. Sudden revolu-
tionary insights are not in sight, the steps are inevitably small. What we can and must 
do is continue to present different causal scenarios and test them both philosophically 
and scientifically. Then, ultimately, we may reach a better understanding of causal ex-
planation and its scope. We need to look at the issue from different angles. And this, in 
essence, is what the present thesis sets out to do.
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3. What is the problem of mental causation?
As already stated, this study treats the problem of mental causation as a general problem 
for philosophy of science at an abstract metaphysical level. However, it is instructive to 
begin by enumerating some of the issues that make up the problem of mental causa-
tion. Often in philosophical discussion the “mental” and the “physical” are stated to be 
difficult to reconcile. But why is that? What are the features in one that make it so ill-
suited for interacting with the other? Note that even though it is the mental realm that 
typically gets represented as some sort of an anomaly, on a closer inspection it is not at 
all straightforward how the physical realm should be defined (as became apparent in the 
preceding discussion). However, there are features in these two notions that are clearly 
in tension with each other. Thus, we can recognize the problems we are facing in trying 
to combine these two realms, even though both lack clear-cut definitions.
There are at least five different problems that need to be separated. Although they 
are connected, each has its own characteristics and an industry of philosophical analysis 
built around it. None of them is negligible, but not all of them are relevant to the current 
discussion. Hence they are mentioned here mainly to sharpen the focus of this study.
Let us start with a problem that was already outlined in the introduction, the problem of 
causal exclusion. As this is the problem that this study is mainly concerned with, a short 
description of the issue will now suffice. Suppose that mental states, our conscious deci-
sions, can have an impact on the physical world. We can control the movements of our 
limbs and alter the course of physical events around us, for example. But suppose also 
that the changes in the material world can be fully accounted for (to the extent that they 
can be accounted for) by physical means. That is, suppose that every physical effect has a 
sufficient physical cause. But then it appears that every physical effect that is caused by 
mental states is caused twice over: once by mental means and once by physical means. 
This seems like an overuse of causes. If that is the case, then one of the two will have to 
go. And if we are not prepared to allow the mental to have a direct, independent influ-
ence on the material world, then it seems that we have no choice but to exclude it alto-
gether: mental states have no real effect on the material world but only piggyback on a 
single continuous and self-contained chain of physical causes and effects.
Second, there is the problem of representational or intentional content. Our mental states, 
at least those that we deem “cognitive”, have semantic content; our thoughts, beliefs and 
desires are about something. I can think of something, and you can think of the same 
thing, and the fact that our mental states have these particular contents can explain our 
behaviour. A simple example: that we both utter “Julius Caesar” when asked which great 
Roman statesman was murdered on the Ides of March 44 BC, is explained by the fact 
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that we both believe that Julius Caesar was murdered on that day. We seem to share the 
same belief, i.e. be in the same mental state with respect to this particular issue, and this 
explains our responses.
Moreover, it seems that this intentional content of our mental states is something 
that is constitutive of them. For suppose that these states are necessarily physically 
grounded, but not uniquely so. That is, although mental states do not exist on their own, 
independently of any physical basis, they are not type-identical with some such basis. 
What makes a mental state the particular mental state it is, is its semantic content, not 
the fact that it happens to be physically realized in a certain way. In consequence, differ-
ent physical states could realize one and the same mental state, as is arguably the case 
with our beliefs about Julius Caesar: our beliefs are identical, but the physical (neural) 
states grounding these beliefs presumably are not.
However, representational content is by definition something relational: represen-
tation is a relation between the symbol of representation and the object of representa-
tion. Given that the object of representation stands outside the person and her mental 
states, it becomes puzzling how that object, or the relation between a given mental state 
and that object, can have an effect on the person and her behaviour. Now, although the 
issue of how terms come to have their references fixed is one of the central problems 
of philosophy of language, this is not the concern here. The problem is that whatever 
way references become fixed, and whatever meaning is, it is something that would not 
appear to make a causal difference in our thinking or our behaviour. It would seem that 
the syntactic features of our mental states and processes are all that is required to ac-
count for our behaviour. It might be convenient for us to describe our behaviour from 
an intentional perspective, but what really matters in how a certain output results from 
given input are the computational inner workings of the system.
Note that couched in these terms, the problem of representational content is a sort 
of a special case of the more general problem of causal exclusion. There seem to be two 
possible explanations for our behaviour, the semantic and the syntactic. But if both are 
equally capable of accounting for our behaviour, it becomes relevant to ask if we are pos-
tulating unnecessarily many explanations. And given that the syntactic account seems 
to be both necessary (in the sense that there is no semantic content without a computa-
tional platform) and sufficient to produce the given output, the syntactic description of 
the behaviour can be seen to pre-empt the semantic description of it.
Third, there is the problem of consciousness. “Consciousness” is a tricky word. The whole 
problem of mental causation can be said to be about consciousness: unless we are con-
scious of what we are doing, our behaviour can hardly be attributed to us. But there 
are different notions of consciousness. If we are not conscious of our actions, we are 
not aware of them. However, when we are discussing the philosophical problem of con-
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sciousness, we are concerned with a different issue: the nature of subjective, qualitative 
consciousness, and its relation to other mental features and overt behaviour.
A way to sharpen these distinctions is to separate two different problems, the easy 
and the hard (Chalmers 1995, 1996). The “easy” problem concerns those aspects of con-
sciousness that can be analyzed by means of a functional role. For example, awareness is 
something that we can all appreciate as being useful to the subject who is being aware: 
by being aware we can observe our environment and guide our actions in accordance 
with our intentions. Awareness is something that helps us to attain what we want and 
avoid what we do not want. This is a capability that is clearly advantageous and, as such, 
something that we have no trouble assigning a functional role to. However, what is really 
peculiar are the subjective qualitative aspects that accompany these experiences and 
feelings through which we become aware of our surroundings. We are not merely aware 
of things around us, or of our own mental states, but there is a specific qualitative aspect 
to these experiences. Seeing a sunset on an African savannah looks like something very 
specific, and being stung by a bee feels like something very specific. These qualitative 
aspects of our experiences are characteristically mental, but can we assign a functional 
role to them? It seems not. We could do very well without the nasty feeling of pain, as 
long as the experience conveyed the information that we are in a situation we had better 
avoid. But if these qualitative aspects of our experiences do not have a role to play in how 
these experiences affect us, it seems that they cannot figure in explaining our behaviour.
Fourth, there is the problem of free will. This problem is often associated with the problem 
of consciousness, especially in scientific discussions. Here it is not consciousness in the 
sense of subjective qualitative mental content that is at issue, but rather consciousness 
in the sense of awareness. In this context awareness appears as a necessary condition of 
free will: only agents capable of being aware of their actions can have free will. However, 
although awareness can constitute an interesting and relevant subject for psychological 
research, the proper problem of free will lies elsewhere.
On closer analysis it becomes apparent that it is not at all clear what “free will” is 
supposed to mean. At first sight the problem seems to be primarily about our appar-
ent inability to influence the physical course of events: if events, including our mental 
states that are dependent on physical states of our body, are determined by prior physi-
cal events, then there seems to be no room for our conscious decisions to have an effect 
on the world. That is, free will is in contradiction with determinism. However, free will 
is also in contradiction with indeterminism. If the physical course of events were totally 
random, we would be equally incapable of influencing it. In fact, it seems that the notion 
of free will is not in contradiction with determinism tout court, but actually presumes a 
sort of determinism, namely psychological determinism: the ability of our mental states 
to determine courses of events.
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One aspect of the problem of free will is clearly reminiscent of the problem of causal 
exclusion. If we think that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, then it 
seems that our conscious decisions and our will for the given effect to occur are com-
pletely superfluous. What free will seems to require is that we can cut into these physical 
chains of events and change them – at will. If that is the case, then the idea is in direct 
contradiction to the physicalistic thesis that all physical causes have a physical effect. 
But there are also other aspects of the problem that touch on the very image of ourselves 
as conscious and morally responsible agents. The fear is that unless there is genuine 
mental causation in the sense of free will, we are stripped of moral responsibility. No 
doubt this is a worry that largely motivates the whole discussion on mental causation. 
However, the verdict on this issue does not depend solely on our account of causation 
and the role of mental states in it, but clearly also on what it takes to be a conscious per-
son and a morally responsible agent. Such questions are outside the scope of this study.
Fifth, there is the problem of normativity. This is a characteristically philosophical prob-
lem. The issue is particularly thorny, incorporating themes not only from the philosophy 
of mind, but also from philosophy of language and from the general discussions on the 
role of normativity within the naturalistic scheme.
The basic issue could perhaps be stated in the following way. There seem to be ra-
tionality constraints on our behaving on the grounds of mental states. That is, to act in 
a way that is essentially dependent on our mental states, our actions must conform to 
some predisposed rules for what it takes to act in that particular way. In other words: 
completely irrational behaviour is typically considered not to be due to mental causes, 
for such behaviour does not match our expectations on how one should act based on 
such causes. But then it appears that whether we have a particular mental state or not, 
and whether this mental state is causally responsible for our behaviour, is dependent on 
how we ought to behave. Such normative facts are in turn difficult to incorporate into the 
purely descriptive, naturalistic way of explaining.
There are many different ways to state this problem more precisely. One way stems 
from the Wittgensteinian (1953) idea that meaning itself is essentially a social and norma-
tive phenomenon: to know the meaning of a term or to have an understanding of a con-
cept is constitutively dependent on the subject’s ability to use that concept in appropriate 
situations in appropriate ways. This is what meaning is. But since concepts, and grasping 
their meaning, seem to be an essential part of explaining behaviour in terms of intention-
al content, this content, and the explanation that rests upon it, seems to become depend-
ent on the way these concepts ought to be used in social contexts. This, in turn, seems to 
render explanations in terms of intentional content essentially non-naturalistic.
Another way is to draw a distinction between reasons and causes and claim that it is 
the former rather than the latter that are essential in explaining behaviour. This idea has 
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attractive intuitive backing: when asking why a person behaved in the way that she did, 
we are typically not interested in hearing a neuro-muscular lecture on her behaviour, 
but an account that gives us understandable reasons for her acting the way that she did. 
What this seems to require is that in order to act in a manner due to mental causes, we 
are required to possess some means of rationally justifying our behaviour. But again, jus-
tification seems to be a thoroughly social and normative phenomenon. Moreover, giving 
reasons for actions seems to be an essentially teleological project: acting in a certain 
way only makes sense in a context where desires and beliefs are appropriately linked to 
specific goals that the given agent has in mind. But teleological explanation is in direct 
conflict with the naturalistic view that is committed to the idea that there is no purpose 
or primitively goal-directed behaviour in nature, and that all proper explanation is ulti-
mately causal and mechanistic.
These five problems, at least, are at issue when “the” problem of mental causation is 
evoked. They are separate problems, each with their own characteristics. It is clear that 
answering some of these issues may not help to solve the others. But the problems are 
also clearly linked, some more closely than others. One recurring theme seems to be the 
problem of causal exclusion. It appears to lie behind many of these separate problems, 
at least partly. Whether this diagnosis can be shown to hold, and whether unlocking the 
causal exclusion problem would result in the unlocking of some of these other prob-
lems as well, is certainly an interesting and relevant question. However, this is not the 
question this thesis is primarily concerned with. What is of prime concern is the causal 
exclusion problem itself. In the following, the problem will be presented in more detail 
together with some responses and elaborations. The upshot of this analysis will be that 
the problem is in need of clarifications, and that once these clarifications are made, the 
simple reductionist solution may not be the only response at the naturalist’s disposal.
4. Causal exclusion
Let us start by stating the causal exclusion argument in a more rigorous manner (Kim 
1998, 2005). Suppose that a mental state M is realized by a physical state P. M and P are 
supposed to be distinct from each other, that is, M is neither identical nor reducible 
to P. However, M is dependent on P in the sense that M could not have occurred on its 
own, without a realizing physical state, and given that P occurred, it was necessary for 
M to occur. Suppose now that there is a further physical state P*, and suppose that P is 
causally sufficient for P*. What role does M have to play in this? It seems none. Since P 
is already sufficient for P* to occur, M is left only a role as an overdeterminer. However, 
such causal overdetermination where mental states would systematically accompany 
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physical states as distinct causes is unacceptable. Hence, M must be excluded as a cause 
of P*.
The problem can be seen to grow out of distinct elements. Consider the following set 
of claims (Bennett 2008):
Distinctness     Mental states are distinct from physical states.
Completeness    Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause.
Efficacy      Mental states cause physical effects  
         (in virtue of their mental features).
Non-overdetermination Systematic overdetermination is impossible.
Exclusion      No effect has more than one sufficient cause  
         unless overdetermined.
These claims seem to be inconsistent with each other. One of them has to go, but which 
one? That is the problem of causal exclusion. The argument of causal exclusion is the ar-
gument to the effect that the first claim, the distinctness of the mental from the physical, 
is the claim that should be dispensed with.
The following will present the three key elements of the issue. These are the distinct-
ness assumption, the completeness assumption and the claim that overdetermining 
causes should be excluded. 
4.1 Distinctness
Mental states are supposed to be distinct from physical states, yet they are also supposed 
to be dependent on them. This is not very informative. In what sense are the two distinct 
from, yet dependent on, each other? This notion clearly calls for clarification.
According to the received view, M and P can have this sort of relationship, when the 
former supervenes on the latter. Supervenience is a notion with a well-defined mean-
ing: a set of S-properties (supervening properties) can be said to supervene on a set of 
R-properties (realizing or subvening properties) when entities cannot differ with re-
spect to their S-properties without differing with respect to their R-properties. In other 
words, if two entities are identical with respect to their R-properties, they are necessar-
ily identical with respect to their S-properties.
Supervenience seems to be well-suited for analyzing the relationship of the mental 
and the physical in naturalistic terms. What the notion entails is that once all the physi-
cal facts in the world are fixed, all the mental facts are fixed as well: “Any world which 
is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter” (Jackson 1998, 12). 
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Mental states or properties do not hover in their own non-material realm of existence, 
but are completely determined and dependent on the physical nature of the world. In 
this sense mental states are nothing “over and above” the physical states they supervene 
on. This is perfectly in line with what the monistic and physicalistic metaphysics of nat-
uralistic philosophy requires. Moreover, the notion also entails that in order to manipu-
late a mental state you need to manipulate the physical state it supervenes on. There is 
no direct access to mental states, but all their changes must proceed via changes in the 
subvening physical states. This also accords well with our physicalist intuitions that all 
mental changes are necessarily accompanied by changes in the neural system ground-
ing those mental states. Otherwise neuroscience would hardly make much sense: it is 
based on the idea that we can study mental processes by studying the neural processes 
underlying them.
But now the obvious question arises: if the mental and the physical are so tightly 
bound together, is there any reason to hold them as distinct? If the mental is not identi-
cal or reducible to the physical, must it not be something “over and above” the physical? 
This is the question that continues to burden the non-reductive physicalist. The conven-
tional reply has been that the supervenience thesis leaves room for the mental states to 
be multiply realizable: it is consistent with the notion that two entities might differ with 
respect to their R-properties without differing with respect to their S-properties. Such 
cases would satisfy the physicalist intuition that no mental state occurs without some 
physical state that realizes it. However, these two states would not have to be identi-
cal, for the very same mental state could have occurred without this particular physical 
state. At the most, the two states are token-identical: this particular event brings the two 
together, by means of physical realization, which explains how the mental could have a 
role to play in the physical courses of events.
However, a moment’s reflection will show that even if the supervenience thesis is 
made more concrete in this manner, there are still fundamental problems left unad-
dressed. Ever since Davidson (1970) brought the supervenience notion to the contem-
porary discussion on the philosophy of mind, it has played the role of a naturalistically 
respectable way of explaining the mind-body relationship. But it is clear that it provides 
no such thing. By itself the notion is compatible with a variety of accounts of the mind-
body problem, such as epiphenomenalism, emergent dualism and identity theory. All of 
these accounts respect the idea that there cannot be differences in mental states with-
out differences in the underlying physical states. More will need to be said in order for 
the notion to become metaphysically useful. Note also that although the notion is typi-
cally presented as a particularly physicalistic way of accounting for the mind-body rela-
tionship, there is nothing physical about it, quite the contrary. This becomes clear if we 
look at the history of the notion. Most notably, Moore (1903) used the notion (although 
not the term) to argue for a non-naturalistic account of the normative realm. Moreover, 
Pernu: Interactions and Exclusions32
the British emergentists used it to elucidate the relationship of basic physical properties 
and higher-level emergent properties. This relationship was inexplicable in naturalistic 
terms, and often the emergent properties possessed novel causal powers. As such, the 
use of the term seems merely to add mystery to mystery. If, then, the naturalist seeks to 
use the term to explicate the relationship of the mental and the physical, it needs to be 
made thicker and more naturalistically viable.
A further thing to note is that it is doubtful whether appealing to the multiple realiz-
ability and token-identity theses is able to amplify the notion in a satisfactory way. The 
basic problem is that once the mental and the physical are deemed distinct, it urges us 
to seek distinct causal roles for the two. But the mental cannot have such a role, if the 
physical realm is causally complete. At most, it is left with an epiphenomenal or redun-
dant role. What we should try to find is a role for the mental features of the given mental 
state to play: such that the mental state, qua mental state, would make a causal difference. 
However, the token-identity thesis seems to aspire to just the opposite: to make the men-
tal state causally efficacious by identifying it with a physical state. Moreover, sometimes 
the supervening properties can be clearly epiphenomenal. Consider this example:
Suppose ricketiness, in a car, is defined as the property of having some loose part. 
Then ricketiness will supervene on physical properties. In a given car, it may be 
realized by a disconnected wire between ignition and starter motor. This discon-
nected wire will cause this car not to start. But it doesn’t follow that this car’s then 
not starting will be caused by its property of ricketiness. Most rickety cars start 
perfectly well. (Papineau 2007.)
It may well be that ricketiness, in the way described, could in some circumstances con-
stitute an acceptable explanation for the fact that the car does not start. But it should be 
incontestable that an explanation in terms how the ricketiness happens to be realized 
will be better and more informative. More importantly, if we start to inquire after the 
causes of this state of affairs, and if we want to make the car start again, the effective 
strategy is not to intervene on its “ricketiness” but to intervene on the physical state 
behind the ricketiness. Ricketiness may supervene on this physical mechanism, and be 
token-identical with it, but it does not appear to play the causal role played by the un-
derlying physical mechanism.
4.2 The causal completeness of the physical
The causal completeness of the physical can be taken to be one of the defining features of 
physicalism. The basic idea is easy to grasp: the physicalistic conviction is that changes in 
the physical world can be perfectly accounted for by physical means. There are no gaps, 
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and there are no miracles. However, there are different ways to define this idea in more 
detail.
Let us make a distinction between completeness and closure. The causal completeness 
thesis could be stated thus:
Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause.
The causal closure thesis could be stated thus:
Every physical effect has only physical causes.
Note first a feature that connects these two theses. They both refer to physical events 
that have causes, namely: physical effects. Neither of the theses should thus be confused 
with the “principle of sufficient reason”, which states that everything has a cause. The 
completeness and closure theses require only that those events that have causes have 
physical causes.
The difference between the two theses is obvious: the first one requires only that 
physical events that have causes have physical causes, while the second one excludes the 
possibility of any other causes. These theses, and their titles, are often used interchange-
ably, but it is important to maintain the distinction, for the latter is clearly stronger than 
the former. It commits us to the idea that we must not go outside the physical realm in 
our search for the causes of physical effects, whereas the former only commits us to the 
idea that we need not go beyond the physical realm.
It is also clear that the latter is unsuitable for discussing the causal exclusion prob-
lem: there is hardly a problem if one of its key elements states outright that physical 
effects have only physical causes. There would simply be no room for mental causation, 
at least not with respect to the physical realm. The completeness thesis does leave such 
room, albeit in a redundant sense, but enough to keep the discussion alive. This differ-
ence should not, of course, be allowed to count in favour of either of the theses. It may 
well be that the physical realm is more adequately characterized as being closed than as 
being merely complete. If that turns out to be the case, then the last half century of phi-
losophy of mind has been in vain. However, this is not the place to decide between these 
two theses. Since the discussion here concentrates on the causal exclusion problem, it is 
simply assumed that the former formulation is adequate.
The thesis has obvious connections to physics, or at least it reminds us of some very 
fundamental physical principles, namely the conservation principles, and the conserva-
tion of energy in particular. The textbook definition of conservation of energy, or the 1st 
law of thermodynamics, states:
The total energy of an isolated system is constant.
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Supposing that effects can be construed as some sort of energetic changes in a given 
system, the principle of conservation of energy seems to imply that for any given effect 
in a system there will be an another corresponding energetic change in the system – a 
cause – and that the two changes will balance each other out. This seems prima facie to 
be an appealing train of thought. A further interesting (and neglected) historical fact is 
that Julius Robert von Mayer, who was the first to state the modern principle of conser-
vation of energy, originally derived it through steps of metaphysical reasoning concern-
ing causal interactions. Based on the then widely accepted metaphysical principle that 
causes and effects in a causal chain must be equal, he derived two general properties of 
causal interactions: the first is that causes are covertly immutable; the second is that 
causes must be overtly transformable. This in turn led him to conclude that “taking both 
properties together, we may say, causes are (quantitatively) indestructible and (qualita-
tively) convertible objects” (Mayer 1842, p. 252). Given that he had already assumed that 
“forces are causes”, this conclusion led him to be the first to formulate the idea that we 
now know as the 1st law of thermodynamics.
How, or whether, this connection between the causal completeness of physics and 
the principle of conservation of energy can be made to hold, is something that deserves 
more detailed study. The intuitive kinship is obvious. However, there are also important 
differences. Most notably, it seems clear that if the connection between the causal com-
pleteness of physics and the principle of conservation of energy is very tight, the com-
pleteness thesis will collapse into the closure thesis. If causes and effects, or whatever 
is transferred between them, should remain invariant across causal interactions, there 
is no room for any additional supervening causes to make their contribution. Any such 
causes would simply constitute a violation of the conservation of energy.
Whatever the details of these two principles, all of these considerations seem to 
point to the basic physicalistic idea that there have to be underlying physical processes 
in every causal interaction, and that these processes are necessarily complete. There 
cannot be independent, totally autonomous, mental to physical causation, but the men-
tal has to work via, or in tandem with, the underlying physical processes. To suppose that 
the mental could influence the physical realm directly, without any physical cause as a 
partner, would amount to the mental appearing as a physical anomaly: physical events 
caused by mental states would appear to us as “miracles” and the physical description of 
the world would become “gappy”, with physical processes vanishing and appearing from 
nowhere. This is something that is unacceptable to every naturalist – no matter how 
non-reductivist. The basic physicalistic conviction is that there cannot be gaps in our 
description of the physical world. This is the conviction that the thesis of causal com-
pleteness of physics tries to capture.
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4.3 Overdetermination and exclusion
Although the previous two elements of the causal exclusion problem have thorny is-
sues related to them, they are nevertheless concerned with very basic commitments of 
naturalism. Mental states simply cannot exist on their own, but need a physical basis on 
which to depend. And mental states cannot exert causal influence in the physical world 
on their own, but need the company of physical states. But the last element in the exclu-
sion problem is more problematic, or at least it is something that does not follow directly 
from the basic commitments of naturalism, but rather from more general metaphysical 
presuppositions.
Let us first make it clear why this last element is necessary to complete the problem. 
One might just maintain that while M supervenes on P, and P causes P*, M also causes P*. 
Since M and P are supposed to be distinct, P* would now have two causes. And this would 
happen systematically: always, when a suitable physical state causes some other physical 
state, there is a mental state supervening on the first physical state that also causes the 
latter physical state. One might claim that this is exactly as it should be, and that there is 
nothing wrong with the picture. If one is not uncomfortable in postulating such redun-
dant causes, there seems to be no logical contradiction in such a move.
However, consider now the following “Principle of Causal Exclusion”:
If an event E has a sufficient cause C (at t), no event (at t) distinct from C can be a 
cause of E – unless this is a genuine case of causal overdetermination.
With this addition, the depicted solution does not work anymore. It has already been 
granted that M and P are distinct, hence the principle of causal exclusion seems to ap-
ply. The only option left to defend the depicted solution would be to bite the bullet and 
claim that every case of mental causation is a genuine case of causal overdetermination. 
But genuine cases of causal overdetermination are typically thought to be rare and co-
incidental. Mental causation is thought to be something quite different: mundane and 
intentional. Claiming that mental causes are always overdetermining causes does not 
seem plausible.
Note first that the principle of causal exclusion, and the whole argumentation con-
cerning overdetermination, is prima facie independent of any physicalist commitments. 
The principle seems to address the issue at a general metaphysical level. As such it is 
something that could easily be acceptable. However, general metaphysical intuitions 
tend to be murky and contradictory, and the principle of causal exclusion is no excep-
tion to this rule.
The notion of causal overdetermination is especially problematic. What is causal 
overdetermination? The notion is often used but rarely defined precisely. The typical 
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definition (for two causes) goes something like this: causes C1 and C2 are overdetermin-
ing causes of an effect E, iff C1 and C2 are distinct and independently sufficient for E to oc-
cur. Two rocks thrown at a window constitute overdetermining causes of the window’s 
breaking if it is the case that each of the rocks would have broken the window on its own.
But now it becomes apparent that this notion is difficult to apply to the case at hand. 
First, are M and P distinct? That is what the non-reductive physicalist is committed to 
believe. But she is also committed to believe that the two are connected. Whatever the 
distinctness claim amounts to, it is clear is that the two are not distinct in a similar way 
as two rocks thrown at a window: first, you cannot intervene on just one of the events 
and prevent it from occurring, while leaving the other event in place, the way that you 
can on either of the rock throwings. Second, are both M and P “independently sufficient” 
for P* to occur? Much of the preceding discussion revolved around the physicalistic con-
viction that M alone was not capable of doing any causing but had to be assisted by P. It 
seems that M alone is not “independently sufficient” for P* to occur, at least not in the 
way that each of the rocks is independently sufficient to break the window.
What this suggests, at minimum, is that there are at least two different notions of 
causal overdetermination at play. Overdetermining causes are typically construed as 
spatiotemporally distinct. This type of causal overdetermination can be called horizontal 
causal overdetermination; C1 and C2 occur at the same level of reality and are thus “hori-
zontally” distinct. But sometimes, as is the case with the causal exclusion problem, the 
focus is on a type of overdetermination where the overdetermining causes are attrib-
uted to different hierarchical levels of reality. This type of causal overdetermination can 
be called vertical causal overdetermination; C1 and C2 occur at different levels of reality 
and are thus “vertically” distinct. (Cf. Funkhouser (2002) who discusses “incorporating” 
and “iterative overdetermination”, and Paul (2007) who discusses “constitutive overde-
termination”.)
The way might now be open to argue that although horizontal cases of causal over-
determination are bad, or at least should not be systematically postulated, there is noth-
ing wrong with systematic vertical causal overdetermination (e.g. Schaffer 2003; Sider 
2003). Although this reply might work with some other cases of vertical overdetermi-
nation, it does not seem very promising in this case. A lot hinges on how the “distinct-
ness” of the levels of reality is understood. Note that the relationship between overde-
termination and distinctness can be construed as a trade-off. The more you pull two 
events apart by stressing their distinctness, the more exposed you become to the threat 
of overdetermination. The more you bring the two closer to each other, the less you may 
need to worry about overdetermination, but the more you are in danger of making the 
two identical. Surely there is no problem with M being an overdetermining cause of P* 
if M = P? But that is exactly the claim that the non-reductive physicalist is committed to 
avoid. So you need to stress the distinctness of the two. But once you do that, it is not 
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clear why M should not become equipped to function as an overdeterminer, albeit as a 
vertical one. Many cases that might be construed as involving vertical overdetermina-
tion are different in this respect. For example, you might claim that a single rock that 
flies through a window constitutes a vertically overdetermining cause of the breaking of 
the window, because the shattering is caused both by the rock and by its parts (cf. Mer-
ricks 2001; Sider 2003). Here, hopefully, you are not at pains to identify the rock with its 
parts. Or, if you are, then you should hold that the rock and its parts are distinct physical 
objects, with different masses and other physical properties, which in turn accounts for 
their separate causal roles. Mental states and physical states that realize them are not at-
tributed to distinct physical objects, however: they are token-identical states of one and 
the same entity. Hence the issue of vertical causal overdetermination with respect to the 
case at hand might not be on a par with other such more concrete cases.
Although applying the notion of causal overdetermination to the relationship be-
tween the mental and the physical is clearly complicated, it is nevertheless a widely 
shared assumption in the discussion that worries about overdetermination are in this 
case justified. However, construing mental states as overdetermining causes is not in 
itself problematic. The real conflict arises when the principle of causal exclusion is 
brought on board.
The exclusion principle is simply a rejection of systematic causal overdetermination. 
It states that events cannot be systematically double-caused, and if this appears to be the 
case, one of the causes has to go. Since the principle is stated as a general metaphysical 
thesis, it does not refer to mental or physical states, or even to higher and lower-level 
states. It assumes that these are simply special cases of a more general metaphysical 
principle grounding causal interactions. But as such, it does not in itself dictate that it is 
the mental cause that has to be excluded. Supposing that both mental and physical states 
are individually sufficient for the given effect, and supposing that this is systematically 
so, the principle merely urges us to exclude either. The conclusion that the mental caus-
es have to go results from joining the principle with the completeness thesis: since the 
physical causes are always there, the mental causes appear redundant and eliminable.
Although the principle is quite generally thought to be plausible, or at least intuitive-
ly appealing, it is practically never argued for. It is simply assumed to be true. As such, it 
is simply a metaphysical credo, a conviction that things are not typically double-caused. 
However, even if this is so, it would be instructive to learn why such a conviction is so 
appealing. At least two arguments can be made in support of the principle.
First, it is fairly obvious that overdetermination is closely related to epiphenome-
nalism. Suppose that one accepts everything else that has been said so far, but rejects 
the exclusion principle. That would result in a view where mental states would always 
accompany physical states as causes. But why would we postulate such causes? What 
difference would such causes make? Apparently none. Since we have already on inde-
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pendent grounds decided that physical causes are all we need, what purpose – other 
than soothing our worries – would it serve to postulate these additional overdetermin-
ing mental causes? Overdetermining causes are by definition redundant or superfluous 
causes, they are something unnecessary and extra; they are something we can well do 
without. That is why the principle sounds so appealing.
Second, although the principle is supposed to be a general metaphysical thesis, inde-
pendent of physicalism or any other metaphysical accounts, it has obvious connections 
to the previous element of the exclusion problem. There are reasons to suspect that it is 
a derivative of the closure formulation of the completeness thesis, or of the basic ideas 
concerning conservation of energy. For, as already noted, if our physical notion of causa-
tion is tied to conservation principles, and to conservation of energy in particular, then 
something of an exclusion principle will become a built-in feature of causation: once a 
physical cause for an effect is designated, it fills the only place vacant for a cause to fill 
and no other cause can make its contribution. Note that on this account the exclusion 
results through elimination of causal overdetermination altogether: it is not due to the 
mental cause being mental that results in it being excluded, rather it is it being an over-
determiner that makes it unsuitable as a cause. All overdetermining causes would need 
to be eliminated and the whole notion of causal overdetermination would need to be 
waived. Being such a problematic notion as it is, this result might just be greeted as a 
welcome bonus.
5. Responses to causal exclusion
Although the causal exclusion problem is put together from elements that seem fairly 
incontestable to the naturalist, discussions are rife with responses to it. Each step in the 
causal exclusion argument has been questioned. Here, however, only responses directly 
relevant to this study will be reviewed, namely those that concern the account of causa-
tion on which the exclusion issue relies.
5.1 Mental causation and physical causation
If you go to a layperson with some philosophical sense and ask her whether there is such 
a thing as mental causation, what would she reply? Most likely: “It depends on what 
you mean by ‘causation’.” In this case the reply is perhaps more appropriate than ever. 
It is by no means obvious what causation is. There are many different accounts, all with 
their own characteristics and problems. It is therefore by no means quibbling to hold 
one’s judgement and await further information. After all, different accounts of causation 
might result in different verdicts.
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However, there is also an intuitive uneasiness with the notion of mental causation. 
Many feel that there is something wrong, or at least problematic, with it. It seems that 
we associate things with mental causation that are hard to reconcile with some of our 
other commitments. The preceding discussion has already detailed many of the con-
crete issues that might act as sources of conflict between the mental and the physical. 
But let us now look at things from the perspective of the causal relation itself.
Modern reactions to the mind-body problem often start by discussing Descartes. Ac-
cording to his dualistic thesis, minds and bodies are distinct substances: my body is one 
entity and my mind is another entity, distinct from my body. This idea has been end-
lessly criticized. However, it is largely a matter of taste whether the modern form of 
non-reductive physicalism is really that far from Descartes’ view. Substance dualism is 
explicitly rejected, of course, but holding on to the distinctness of the two realms seems 
to amount to some sort property dualism. The connections of these views also become 
apparent when we turn to look at the problematic causal relationship of the two realms.
Although postulating these two different substances may help us to explain some of 
the differences we attribute to these two realms, it immediately raises others. The most 
notable of these is the problem of interaction: if the mind and the body are separate 
substances, each with their own characteristic – and conflicting – features, how can the 
two be in a causal interaction with each other? A much cited formulation of this problem 
was made by Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia in 1643:
[H]ow the human soul can determine the movement of the animal spirits in the 
body so as to perform voluntary acts – being as it is merely a conscious substance. 
For the determination of movement seems always to come about from the mov-
ing body’s being propelled – to depend on the kind of impulse it gets from what 
sets it in motion, or again, on the nature and shape of this latter thing’s surface. 
Now the first two conditions involve contact, and the third involves that the im-
pelling thing has extension; but you utterly exclude extension from your notion 
of soul, and contact seems to me incompatible with a thing’s being immaterial.” 
(Anscombe & Geach 1954, p. 274–275.)
Supposing, as Descartes did, that the two substances differ radically from each other, it 
becomes relevant to ask how the two can causally interact. One of the defining features 
of mental substances is their non-extension, whereas one of the defining features of 
physical substances is their extension. But if that is the case, how can a non-extend-
ed entity have a causal impact on an extended entity? Moreover, if causation (at least 
physical causation) is something that involves contact by extended bodies – as Princess 
Elizabeth in the quotation assumes – then the mental substances seem to be stripped of 
causal power.
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The easy and often used reply to the problems raised here is that not only is Descartes’ 
view on the relationship of the mental and the physical invalid, but the notion of cau-
sation that he and many of his contemporaries relied on is now defunct. The line of 
thought is that if we only replace this naively mechanistic and outdated view of causa-
tion with a more sophisticated and modern one, the problem will evaporate. How the 
notion of causation is understood is at the heart of the matter.
Is the view presented in the quotation above naïve and outdated? It may be prema-
ture to announce it as such. First, the problems annoying the modern-day non-reduc-
tive physicalists are not that far from the problems that Descartes was facing. Mental 
and physical features are now attributed to one and the same entity, but the features 
themselves are supposed to be distinct. And that is, as before, the real source of the prob-
lem. How can mental states, qua mental, have an effect on the physical world that is caus-
ally complete – that is the question. The issue is still with something that is separate 
and fundamentally different having an influence on the physical. The only difference, it 
seems, is that now we are admitting that the physical realm is causally complete and that 
the mental is always physically realized.
Second, it is not far-fetched to say that the problems that we are now facing with the 
notion of mental causation stem from essentially similar commitments about funda-
mental physical causal interactions. Although the problem in the quotation is couched 
in terms of mechanical contact – of which a non-extended entity is incapable – and al-
though such a notion of causation may be obsolete, there are still strong intuitions that 
causal interactions fundamentally involve physical contiguity and local interaction. This 
intuition is often shared even by those who are prone to analyze the notion of causation 
in terms other than physical processes. The idea that genuine causation essentially has 
something to do with physical production, generation, transference or “bringing about” 
is strong within our physicalist world view. This intuition may be wrong, of course, but 
it is certainly something that lies behind our difficulties in comprehending the notion 
of mental causation. And it is something that Princess Elizabeth would no doubt have 
found easy to accept. 
Recent philosophy has also witnessed a rise of well-developed physical analyses of 
causation (e.g. Aronson 1971; Bigelow et al. 1988; Bigelow & Pargetter 1990; Castañeda 
1980; Dowe 1995, 2000; Fair 1979; Heathcote 1989; Salmon 1984, 1994, 1997, 1998). Typi-
cally causation is understood to consist in energy/momentum transfer. Most notably 
Dowe (2000) defines a causal process as a world line of an object that possesses a con-
served quantity, and a causal interaction as an intersection of world lines that involves 
exchange of a conserved quantity. Such accounts should have no trouble accepting the 
completeness thesis, exclusion arguments and – in essence – the view of causation that 
Princess Elizabeth endorsed (cf. Kim 2007). Although these accounts of causation are 
modern and elaborate, what the critics would still insist, however, is that they are based 
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on intuitions that should be given up – or, at least, that there are other stronger causal 
intuitions that we should respect at the cost of these physical intuitions. These intui-
tions, in turn, might amount to a different notion of causation. Maybe such a notion 
might also provide a way out of the exclusion worries? Let us turn to these accounts.
5.2 The counterfactual response
The most notable alternative to the physical notion of causation is the counterfactu-
al notion of causation. This notion was introduced by Lewis (1973, 1986) and has since 
gained a large following. Typically this view is said to hold that an event C causes (a logi-
cally distinct event) E only in case it is true that if C had not occurred, E would not have 
occurred either. Again, this sounds like a prima facie intuitively plausible idea.
Let us first be more precise in defining the notion, for this will turn out to be impor-
tant later on. According to the counterfactual account of causation, an event C causes 
the occurrence of another distinct event E (in a world w), iff the following pair of coun-
terfactuals hold (in w):
(a) C ☐→ E 
(b) ~C ☐→ ~E
The first condition is usually omitted. Whether such an omission is justified depends 
on the details of the semantic interpretation imposed on these counterfactuals. If it is 
assumed, as it typically is, that the occurrence of C and E (in w) makes the first counter-
factual vacuously true (in w), then the omission is understandable.
What is noticeable about this account is that it is the counterfactual dependence of E 
on C that makes the latter the cause of the former. That is, there is no other connection 
or process between the two. If we connect this to the preceding discussion we can draw 
a distinction between two radically different types of causal notions (Hall 2004). The first 
we can call the production notion. This is the idea that causation is essentially a matter of 
spatiotemporally local transference, exchange or production of a physical quantity. The 
second can be called the dependence notion. This is the idea that causation is simply a 
matter of counterfactual dependence between distinct events. Now two questions arise: 
should such a dependence notion be preferred at the cost of the production notion, and 
if so, is the notion able to provide a non-reductivist answer to the exclusion problem? 
Let us tackle the latter question first.
The basic idea, advocated numerous times and ways in the discussion, how the coun-
terfactual notion of causation can help us to escape the exclusion problem is as follows. 
Suppose again that we have a mental state M supervening on a physical state P and that 
there is a physical state P* for which P is causally sufficient. Now it appears that the fol-
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lowing counterfactual is true: if M had not occurred, then P* would not have occurred 
either. Given that this is sufficient for holding that P* is counterfactually dependent on 
M, and given that counterfactual dependence is all there is to causation, then it appears 
that there is such a thing as genuine mental causation after all.
Could it really be this easy? There are reasons to be doubtful. The following objec-
tion should immediately spring to mind: in virtue of what does this counterfactual hold? 
The reductive physicalist is ready to reply: the counterfactual holds simply in virtue of 
the underlying physical causal interaction between P and P*. Even an epiphenomenalist 
might not object to the apparent veracity of the counterfactual. She would just think of 
it as a reflection of the genuine underlying causal relationship. Thus, merely noting that 
the described counterfactual dependence exists is not enough to soothe the worries of 
those who are moved by the exclusion problem. It would need to be supplemented with 
an argument to the effect that counterfactual dependency is really all there is to causa-
tion.
The physical notion of causation – whatever its details – is definitely problematic, 
as already discussed. One strategy, then, is to criticise the very idea that there are any 
deeper physical causal processes of which the counterfactual dependencies are deriva-
tive (cf. Loewer 2007). That is, there are not two notions of causation, production and 
dependence, but only one, the latter. However, the counterfactual notion of causation, of 
course, is not free of problems. First, the account relies on the notion of possible worlds, 
which is notoriously problematic. They are ontologically problematic: what – and where 
– are all these possible worlds? But more importantly, they are semantically problem-
atic: how to assess which worlds are closer than others to the world that we happen to 
be interested in? We can easily find ourselves on a slippery slope to all sorts of goofy 
scenarios that might not be that attractive to a physicalist. Second, it may be necessary 
for the counterfactual view to resort to elements of physical causation in trying to find 
a way to get rid of annoying counterexamples. Redundant causation (overdetermina-
tion and preemption) are problematic, for in these cases the described counterfactual 
dependence seems to break down: the occurrence of E is no longer counterfactually 
dependent on C, since there is an alternative to C that would bring about E in the ab-
sence of C. Consider preemption. The theory needs to be supplemented by a clause that 
explains why the preempting cause rather than the preempted alternative brings about 
the effect. A natural, and widely accepted, solution is to appeal to the fact that there is a 
“complete process” between the preempting cause and the effect, which the preempted 
cause and the effect lack (e.g. Lewis 2000; McDermott 1995; Menzies 1989, 1996, 1999; 
Noordhof 1999; Ramachandran 1997; Rueger 2006; Schaffer 2001, 2003). How to cash out 
the notion of “complete process”? It turns out that these accounts typically build on the 
view developed by Dowe (2000) and Salmon (1984, 1994, 1997, 1998). It appears that we 
are back to square one.
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5.3 Interventionism and difference-making
The discussions and notions reviewed above have been hugely influential and are still in 
many ways relevant. However, a more elaborate way of dealing with the exclusion issue 
has arisen in recent years. This interventionist or difference-making account is a descend-
ant of the counterfactual view, which makes it a species of the dependency account of 
causation. However, it has been carefully constructed to avoid the problems the more 
traditional counterfactual account is bound to face.
The interventionist account of causation draws from the theory of causal explana-
tion developed by Woodward (2003). Causation is defined thus:
A necessary and sufficient condition for C to be a direct cause of E with respect to 
some variable set V is that there be a possible intervention on C that will change E 
(or the probability distribution of E) when all other variables in V besides C and E 
are held fixed at some value by interventions. (Woodward 2003, p. 55.)
It is already clear from this short characterization that this account changes some of the 
basic elements in the discussion in a dramatic way. First, the preceding discussion has 
been overly vague about the exact nature of the causal relata. They have been referred to 
as properties, states and events. However, the interventionist account has a clear view 
on how the causal relata should be understood: they are variables (type-causation) or 
values of variables (token-causation). It may be that property instantiations or the oc-
currence of states or of events can be understood as a given variable assuming a specific 
value, but whether such analogies or reductions can be made to hold is not of concern 
here. What is more important is that this approach allows us to analyse claims about 
causal relationships in a much more precise way. Construing the causal relata as vari-
ables should also appeal to the naturalist, for this is the way causal relationships are 
represented throughout the sciences.
Second, causal claims are always assessed with respect to a specific variable set V. 
Again, this is a welcome clarification, for now you have to make it explicit right from the 
start what sort of variables (and relationships) the discussion pertains to. However, this 
also makes the results malleable, for changing the variable set might have an effect on 
whether or how a given causal relationship holds.
Third, “intervention” is clearly a causal notion. Causality is thus defined in terms that 
are causal themselves. In other words, the interventionist account of causation relies 
on a non-reductive analysis of causation (in contrast to the accounts discussed previ-
ously). Of course, it is pertinent to ask whether such an analysis is ultimately illuminat-
ing. However, this approach has the advantage that it sits in well with the explanatory 
practices prevalent in the special sciences. From this perspective it matters very little 
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whether causality can be analysed in physical or counterfactual terms. What is impor-
tant is how causal inferences are actually made in the sciences. This is again something 
that should appeal to the naturalist.
Armed with these reforms, does the interventionist account offer a solution to the 
causal exclusion problem? It has certainly been argued that it does (e.g. Campbell 2008, 
2010; List & Menzies 2009, Menzies 2008; Menzies & List 2010; Raatikainen 2010; Sha-
piro 2010, 2012; Shapiro & Sober 2007; Woodward 2008a, 2008b). However, what be-
comes immediately clear is that there are many interpretative difficulties in applying the 
notion to the exclusion issue. This is something that has been largely overlooked.
Suppose first that the variable set we are interested in is simply V = {M, P, P*} (through-
out the discussion these are assumed to be binary variables). But this is not enough. 
What the exclusion problem supposes is that these variables are connected in subtle 
ways – that is the whole source of the problem. What the interventionist account as-
sumes, however, is that the variables can be intervened on independently of each other 
(except for the cause and effect variables). Suppose that the states to which the variables 
in V refer all occur, i.e., the variables assume the values M = 1, P = 1, P* = 1. Suppose that 
you now intervene on M and change its value to 0, to see whether it is the cause of P*. 
To honour the definition of direct cause, you would need to hold P fixed. But that cannot 
be done because M supervenes on P and holding P fixed would in this case amount to M 
being held fixed, which contradicts the idea of testing whether M is a cause by changing 
its value. Since it appears that there is no intervention on M that would change the value 
of P* while other variables in V (i.e. P) are held fixed, the definition leads us to conclude 
that M is not a cause of P* (Baumgartner 2009). This is epiphenomenalism, and not the 
result we were hoping for.
Suppose we relax the definition and assume that in this case – or more generally in 
cases where supervenient variables are intervened on – we are not compelled to hold 
the subvenient variable fixed. Now one could argue in the following way:
Because changing M is impossible without simultaneously changing M’s super-
venience base P, and because P is a cause of P*, a change in M does result in a 
change in P*. This is evidence that M is a cause of P*. (Shapiro 2010, p. 601.)
Is this conclusion plausible? Note that this is exactly the same inference that the tradi-
tional counterfactualist account attempted to offer as a solution to the exclusion prob-
lem. If it didn’t convince you then, it is difficult to see why it should convince you now. 
In fact, in this context the inference is even more clearly unfortunate, for now the result 
is that the values of M and P vary entirely in phase: setting M to 1 results in setting P to 
1 and setting M to 0 results in setting P to 0, and vice versa. That is, M and P don’t seem 
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to differ at all with respect to their causal profiles. This certainly solves the exclusion 
problem: this is simply reductive physicalism. Again, not the result we were hoping for.
However, if we fiddle with V things get more interesting. Suppose we take into ac-
count the idea that M is multiply realizable, thus V = {M, P1, P2, P*}. Now P1 and P2 are mu-
tually exclusive supervenience bases of M: when M assumes the value 1, either of them 
also assumes the value 1; when M assumes the value 0, both of them assume the value 0. 
This arrangement allows us to intervene on these two subvenient variables while hold-
ing the supervenient variable fixed. Or, to be more precise, if the value of M is 1, then 
we can hold it fixed while intervening on its base, provided only that either P1 or P2 is 
assuming the value 1. Given this setting, intervening on either P1 or P2 does not result in a 
change in P*, which means that neither of them is a cause of P*. However, as was already 
established, intervention on M does result in such a change. Hence, M is a cause of P* 
and the idea of mental causation is finally vindicated.
One way of putting this result in more concrete terms is to say that construing M 
as the cause of P* captures the relationship at the right level. Although either P1 or P2 is 
necessarily there as well, each of them is too specific to function as a genuine cause of P*. 
M seems to act as a “control switch” or “control variable” for P* (cf. Campbell 2010): the 
values of P* seem to change in accordance with the values of M, not in accordance with 
the values of P1 or P2.
Yet another way to formulate this idea is to say that M is a difference-making cause 
of P*, whereas P1 or P2 are not. To say that M is a difference-making cause of P* means 
simply that the following pair of counterfactuals hold (cf. List & Menzies 2009):
(1a) M ☐→ P* 
(1b) ~M ☐→ ~P*
It seems intuitively uncontroversial to accept these counterfactuals (as before, even a 
reductive physicalist or epiphenomenalist might accept them). But consider now the 
following two pairs of counterfactuals:
(2a) P1 ☐→ P* 
(2b) ~P1 ☐→ ~P* 
(3a) P2 ☐→ P* 
(3b) ~P2 ☐→ ~P*
Those attracted by this approach will claim that both (2b) and (3b) are actually false by 
arguing, roughly, in the following way. Given that M occurs and we hold it fixed, then in 
the case of (2b) the fact that P1 does not occur must imply that P2 occurs, and vice versa, 
in case of (3b) the fact that P2 does not occur must imply that P1 occurs. So the occurrence 
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of M implies that either of the supervenience bases occurs, and hence intervening on 
these bases while holding M fixed does not result in a change in P*. To present this argu-
ment in detail would of course entail a lot of semantic jiggling, but the basic idea seems 
intuitively clear enough. No doubt this argumentation is something that the original 
counterfactual account was seeking all along.
The key assumption behind these results is that causes and effects must be propor-
tional to each other (Yablo 1992). Proportionality can be understood as a thesis that caus-
es must not contain anything more than what is necessary to bring about the effect. M 
seems to be proportional to P*, for the occurrence of M brings about the occurrence of 
P* (1a) and the absence of M brings about the absence of P* (1b). However, the superveni-
ence bases of M are not proportional to P*, for the latter condition is not met.
This approach sounds attractive, but there are at least three problematic issues that 
it has to address.
First, the underlying proportionality assumption is by no means innocent. It has to 
face at least two different critical questions. First, are causal relationships really gov-
erned by such a requirement? Is it really an essential mark for genuine causal relations? 
There are intuitively clear cases of causal relationship that are not proportional (Shapiro 
& Sober 2012). Second, are physical effects really proportional to mental causes? Are they 
always such? The argumentation has simply assumed that such a proportionality rela-
tionship holds, but this is clearly an issue that needs more thorough analysis.
Second, the other key assumption in the argumentation is that mental states are 
multiply realizable. But again, two critical questions arise. First, is there such a thing as 
multiple realization? The standard assumption in the discussion has been that there is 
indeed such a thing. But this assumption has started to receive criticism (e.g. Bechtel & 
Mundale 1999; Bickle 1998, 2003, 2010; Couch 2004; Shapiro 2000, 2004, 2008). Perhaps 
the use of the thesis is justified because it has had such a prestigious position and there 
doesn’t seem to be much non-reductive physicalism left if the thesis is rejected. Howev-
er, as the discussion progresses, this thesis cannot simply be taken for granted. Second, 
what role exactly does the multiple realizability thesis play in the argumentation? More 
specifically: how to interpret the idea that given that M is held fixed and either P1 or P2 is 
intervened on, suddenly the other ”back-up” realizer pops up and assumes the position 
that corresponds to the occurrence of M and P*? It seems that this picture requires more 
detailed explanation and justification.
Third, the argumentation seems to run into trouble with the thesis of causal com-
pleteness. If it is claimed, as it typically is, that the argumentation not only shows how M 
is the proper cause of P*, but also shows how P1 or P2 is not, then the conclusion seems 
to amount to the rejection of the completeness thesis. But the thesis has typically been 
taken to be non-negotiable. Moreover, if one is prepared to reject the completeness the-
sis, why bother with the exclusion problem in the first place?
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6. The autonomy solution and interventionist parallelism
There is still one remaining response for the causal exclusion problem to face. The au-
tonomy solution stresses that there is really no competition between the mental and 
physical states over the status of the “real cause”. Instead, the mental is autonomous 
with respect to the physical, and vice versa. This response has different variations and 
is by no means a new invention. It emanates from Leibniz’s response to the problems 
evoked by Descartes’ interactionism, namely the idea of pre-established harmony. Al-
though Leibniz is practically never credited in the current discussion, the view has many 
modern incarnations. The following will not review all of them, but rather focus on the 
one that is elaborated in the present thesis, namely the idea of interventionist parallelism.
The autonomy response has been presented in the current discussion in a number 
of different forms (e.g. Crisp & Warfield 2001; Gibbons 2006; Jackson 1996; Marras 1998; 
Schlosser 2009; Thomasson 1998). Again, merely saying that “the mental is autonomous 
with respect to the physical” does not amount to much. An epiphenomenalist and a re-
ductive physicalist can accept such a statement. They do not necessarily have difficul-
ties with the idea that the special sciences are autonomous with respect to fundamental 
physics. They do not necessarily advocate eliminativism and they can accept the idea 
that these higher-level descriptions and explanations may be useful to us and hence 
something worth holding on to. What they do resist is leaping from these pragmatic 
notions to the full-blown metaphysical notion that mental causation is a genuine and 
autonomous phenomenon. What the defender of this solution must do, then, is offer 
more than just pragmatic or epistemic considerations. The argument has to sink into the 
very notion of causal explanation.
One way of being an autonomist is to note that there is no problem with claiming 
that one and the same thing can have several different causal explanations that do not 
necessarily compete. Explanation is a highly context and interests sensitive matter. 
Surely, then, one thing can have several causal explanations, each appropriate in its own 
way? Causation itself might also be divided into different types. Already Aristotle distin-
guished four different types of causal relationships. These have not been considered to 
be in competition with each other. Yet, the reductive physicalist would insist that we talk 
about physical explanations and physical (or “efficient”) causation. Only causal explana-
tions in these terms amount to fundamentally real explanations. Once this is acknowl-
edged, other explanations seem to compete with them.
However, the typical autonomist response amounts to a stronger claim. According 
to it, the effect to which we are trying to pin-point the correct cause is distinct from the 
effect that has an unequivocally physical explanation. Thus, the mental and the physi-
cal are not in interaction with each other, but both mental causes and mental effects 
are distinct from physical causes and effects. Hence there is clearly no competition be-
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tween these explanations. Again, both the reductive physicalist and the epiphenomenal-
ist might concede this view, but insist that now both the causes and effects are merely 
reflections of the real, underlying physical causal processes. However, the force of this 
view, when both causal relata are separated in this way, is that now both of the domains 
become closed. Most notably: now mental effects – or higher-level effects in general – 
can be shown to be due to exclusively mental causes.
Before introducing an argument to this effect in the interventionist framework, let 
us review a general argument purporting to show that these sorts of autonomy solutions 
cannot work. This is the so-called supervenience argument, an extension of the exclusion 
argument (in fact, the latter is often formulated in terms of the former, but it is impor-
tant to keep these arguments apart). Suppose that instead of the question of whether the 
mental state M causes the physical state P*, we are interested in the question of whether 
the mental state M causes another mental state M*. According to Kim (1998, 2005), this 
type of mental-to-mental causation will also succumb to the exclusion argument in the 
following way. Given physicalism, M* has to have a physical realizer on which it super-
venes, namely P*. Now, according to Kim (1998, 2005), there are two competing explana-
tions for the occurrence of M*, namely M and P*. The relationship between P* and M* is 
not causal, of course, but one can still see it as a competing explanation, or at least creat-
ing tension between these two explanations. But once P* is there, M* cannot help being 
there, and hence this relationship seems like a better explanation for the occurrence of 
M*. So in order for M to cause M* it has to cause the supervenience base of M*, namely 
P*. But now we are back at the original exclusion problem, and the argument says that 
M is not a cause of P*. Hence, M is not a cause of M* either, and the autonomy solution 
is refuted.
Based on the interventionist notion of causation, however, it can be shown that this 
train of thought is not valid. That is, the supervenience argument can be shown to be 
invalid although the exclusion argument is valid. This scenario also has the advantage of 
putting many other problematic issues in place.
Note first that in order for any substantial argument to get off the ground, we need to 
expand the supervenience bases. Suppose that simply V = {M, P, M*, P*}. Now, as before, 
the supervenient and subvenient variables would vary in phase with each other. That 
would amount to identifying M with P and M* with P*, and that would not be a welcome 
result. However, suppose that we now expand the supervenience bases and take into 
account that M* is also supposed to be multiply realizable. So now let V = {M, P1, P2, M*, 
P*1, P*2}, and suppose that M happens to be realized by P1 and M* by P*1, and thus the vari-
ables assume the following values: M = 1, P1 = 1, P2 = 0, M* = 1, P*1 = 1, P*2 = 0. If we now 
test different causal claims with respect to this variable set (and the relevant constraints 
imposed on it) there are three results worth highlighting: M is a cause of neither P*1 nor 
P*2, and neither P1 nor P2 is a cause of M*, but M is a cause of M*.
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First, and contrary to what the previous interventionist argument showed, there is 
no such thing as mental-to-physical causation. In other words, the exclusion argument 
holds. For suppose that we now intervene on M and change its value, and suppose we are 
interested in testing whether M is a cause of P*1. Given the distribution of values of the 
variables, this particular intervention (that sets M to 0) does indeed result in a change 
in P*1. However, suppose that we start with a different distribution, with one that corre-
sponds to a situation where none of the states that these variables refer to occur, thus M 
= 0, P1 = 0, P2 = 0, M* = 0, P*1 = 0, P*2 = 0. Intervene now on M and change its value. Does 
the value of P*1 change accordingly? Not necessarily, because P*1 was an alternative super-
venience base of M* and each of these bases could equally well occur. Setting M to 1 could 
result, for example, in the following distribution of values: M = 1, P1 = 0, P2 = 1, M* = 1, P*1 
= 0, P*2 = 1. Hence, setting M to 1 would result in setting P*1 = 0. This in turn would mean 
that M would fail to be a “control variable” for P*1, and, consequently, a cause of P*1. The 
same holds, mutatis mutandis, with respect to P*2. Thus, M is a cause of neither P*1 nor P*2.
Second, there is no such thing as physical-to-mental causation either. Suppose that 
we start with the original distribution of values and intervene on P1, but hold M fixed. 
But we are supposing that in such a case the alternative supervenience base of M as-
sumes the value of 1. This in turn leads to either P*1 or P*2 assuming the value of 1 (sup-
posing that the bases of M are causally sufficient for the bases of M*). But that means that 
the value of M* remains unchanged. Hence P1 would fail to be a “control variable” for M*, 
and, consequently, a cause of M*. Again, the same holds, mutatis mutandis, with respect 
to P2. Thus, neither P1 nor P2 is a cause of M*.
Finally, there is such a thing as mental-to-mental causation. In other words, the su-
pervenience argument fails to hold. Suppose that we start with the original distribution 
of values and intervene on M and change its value. Now both of the subvenient variables 
are set to 0. This in turn means that all of the other variables are also set to 0. Hence, set-
ting M to 0 results in setting M* to 0. The original distribution of the values of the vari-
ables already shows that setting M to 1 can result in setting M* to 1. However, supposing 
that the bases of M are causally sufficient for the bases of M*, setting M to 1 will result in 
setting M* to 1. Hence M would seem to be a “control variable” for M*, and, consequently, 
a cause of M*.
Since this argument is a developed version of the interventionist response to the 
causal exclusion argument it is expected to share its pros and cons. It relies on the pro-
portionality requirement and multiple realizability thesis. As before, these are not un-
problematic assumptions. However, interventionist parallelism has certain advantages 
over the interactionist version. Most notably, the physical domain is now safely closed: it 
was established that mental states never cause the occurrence of physical states. Moreo-
ver, the worries about overdetermination evaporate: physical and mental states cause 
separate effects, and thus there is no single effect that could become overdetermined.
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However, rejecting interactionism works both ways. It was not only established that 
the physical domain is closed. It was also established that the mental domain is closed, 
i.e. there is no such thing as physical-to-mental causation either. In other words, the pin 
prick on your finger does not cause your pain. But isn’t this unacceptably counter-in-
tuitive? Not necessarily. We can interpret the causal processes thus: as the pin pushes 
through your skin this leads to a particular state in your nervous system that in turn real-
izes your pain experience. This sounds both scientifically acceptable and intuitively plau-
sible. What we need to realize is that letting go of interactionism – which was a deeply 
problematic position to begin with – eliminates not only mental-to-physical causation, 
but also physical-to-mental causation. The best we can do is to embrace parallelism.
7. Conclusions
The notion of causal explanation is an essential element of the naturalistic world view. 
However, it is not something that can just be taken from a toolbox and used to solve 
any outstanding philosophical problem. Views vary on what the notion amounts to ex-
actly. Fields of science vary with respect to their causal commitments. There is no single 
monolithic, unanimously accepted notion of causation that the naturalist can simply 
just put into use.
One of the metaphilosophical messages of this study is that the relationship between 
naturalistic philosophy and the notion of causal explanation requires clarification. What 
is the causal criterion for reality? What kind of notion of causation does that presup-
pose? Is there such a thing as physical causation? If there is, what is its relationship to 
causal explanation in other sciences? Naturalism and physicalism are undoubtedly close 
companions. That physical facts determine all the facts there are is the central convic-
tion of naturalism. However, whether this entails a particular physical view of causation, 
and whether such a view is the only naturalistically acceptable one, is an open philo-
sophical question.
The exclusion argument purports to show that physical causal processes indeed con-
stitute all of the real causal processes that there are. However, this conclusion relies on 
the assumption that all genuine causes must have physical effects: the argument invites 
us to ask whether a given mental state that supervenes on a particular physical state can 
have an effect on another physical state. But isn’t this begging the question? Was it not 
the very idea of wholly physical causation that was called into question? No wonder the 
reductive view has the upper hand if the game is constantly played on its home ground. 
This game has been allowed to continue because the non-reductivist protests have been 
sparse. It has been taken for granted, by all parties, that genuine causal interaction results 
in physical effects. But is that really something that a naturalist must be committed to?
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The non-reductive physicalist is ready to grant more to reality than basic physical 
properties and physical causal processes. Apparently that could, and should, include 
also effects other than the physical kind. Then, apparently, the view could, and should, 
include causal interactions that are completely distinct from underlying physical pro-
cesses. Such parallelism should constitute the default non-reductivist position. But for 
some reason, this option has not been on the table.
The only reasonable explanation for this situation seems to be that some kind of 
physical notion of causation has been tacitly taken for granted. That is why the exclusion 
argument has seemed so insurmountable. But the non-reductivist is typically explicitly 
sceptical – on naturalistic grounds – of the physical notion of causation, and instead 
advocates a notion that relies solely on counterfactual dependence. What the present 
study shows is that, in this context, the parallelistic view is particularly enticing.
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